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ON HERESY, MIND, AND TRUTH 
Alvin Plantinga 
In this article I thank Eleonore Stump, Peter van Inwagen, and Merold 
Westphal for their gracious and insightful comments on my "Advice"; then 
I try to reply. 
First, my thanks to Eleonore, Peter and Merold for their thoughtful reac-
tions to my advice. I'm certainly pleased and flattered that three such ter-
rific Christian philosophers would take the time and effort to comment, in 
this way, on that advice. I'll try to respond, and will respond to their com-
ments in alphabetical order. 
I have little to say to Eleonore Stump's comments. That is not because I 
think her topic unimportant or her reflections without insight or worth: 
absolutely not. The topics of heresy, and how to treat those who fall into it, 
are of great importance. I deplore the tendency of some Christians to sup-
pose that the whole idea of heresy is an outworn relic of an earlier age, an 
idea whose time is past. Clearly the idea of heresy has obvious application 
at a time, like the present, when allegedly Christian theologians claim, for 
example, that there really is no such person as God, or that God really isn't 
a person but is instead the historical evolutionary process that has brought 
us into being. It's just that I don't myself have much of interest to say on 
the topic beyond what Stump says. 
However I do have (a) a mild disagreement and (b) an additional 
caveat. First, Stump says If Although it seems to me important to keep the 
notion of heresy, I think the notion of heretic should be discarded for any 
purpose other than historical description. That's because a heretic is sup-
posed to be someone who is committed to a heresy and who because of his 
heresy is worthy to be thrown out of the orthodox community" (p. 147). 
Here it looks like a heresy is a belief of a certain sort. One can speak, for 
example, of the Arian heresy; and anyone who accepts that belief accepts a 
heretical belief. On the other hand, says Stump, a person who accepts a 
heretical belief is not to be accounted a heretic, since this latter means that 
she is fit to be thrown out of the orthodox community, which Stump thinks 
is wrong. But later she says If • •• more than the rejection of a belief which is 
orthodox is required for heresy. For a belief to count as heretical, it is also 
necessary that the person holding that belief recognize that it has been 
rejected as unorthodox by a long-established consensus of the accepted 
experts in the religious community" (p. 158). 
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These two passages don't seem to me to fit together well. According to 
the first, we can think of a belief simpliciter, or perhaps a proposition sim-
pliciter, as heretical. According to the second passage, though, a belief as 
such isn't heretical; to rise (or fall) to the level of heresy that belief must be 
held by someone in a certain way. But that means then, that the Arian 
heresy is not necessarily heretical; if your friend Paul holds it in ignorance 
of its having been rejected as unorthodox by a long-established consensus 
of the accepted experts in the religious community, then with respect to 
him, anyway, it doesn't constitute heresy. I'm not sure how to put these 
two ideas together. I'm inclined to concur with Stump's earlier passage: it 
seems that some beliefs, e.g., the Arian heresy, are in fact heretical just in 
themselves. When it is held in the sort of ignorance I mentioned above, 
then the thing to say, I think, is that Paul is not a heretic, although this 
belief he holds is indeed heretical. On the other hand, if Paul arrogantly 
holds this belief in full knowledge that it has been rejected by the relevant 
experts and the Christian tradition, but says he doesn't give a fig either for 
the experts or the tradition, shouldn't we say that Paul is a heretic? Of 
course that still leaves open the question whether Paul should be thrown 
out of the orthodox community. 
That's the mild disagreement: here's the caveat. Sometimes it is exceed-
ingly hard to determine what is and what isn't heresy. No doubt God pro-
tects his church from error-sure enough; at any rate he protects it from cer-
tain kinds of error. But everything we human beings do is infected by sin 
and by the results of sin. So even in the formulation of our most cherished 
beliefs, even in the formulation of our creeds, we can't expect anything like 
perfection. The creeds are not written by God, but by us human beings. 
Consider, for example, the development of Christological doctrine cul-
minating in Chalcedon (451 AD). (What comes next is a bit of church his-
tory, at which I am no expert; it is also so short as to run the risk of falling 
into caricature. But here goes anyway.) It looks as if two quite different 
views of the Incarnation were (perhaps confusedly) present before 
Chalcedon and represented at Chalcedon. One was the view of Cyril of 
Alexandria and his followers: on this view, when the second person of the 
Trinity became incarnate and assumed human nature, what happened was 
that he, the second person of the Trinity, acquired the property of being 
human; he acquired whatever property it is that is necessary and sufficient 
for being human. (Of course he also had properties no other human has or 
has had, and even properties no other human being could have had, just as 
you and I do.) The human nature he assumed, then, was a property. This 
view has the advantage of fitting well with the scriptures, which seem to 
suggest that the preexistent Logos did indeed empty himself and become a 
human being; on this view, also, it is the second person of the Trinity, the 
pre-existent Logos himself, who is tempted, and suffers and dies on our 
account. 
On this first view, therefore, the second person of the Trinity assumed 
human nature, i.e. assumed a property which is necessary and sufficient for 
being a human being. On the second view, by contrast, what he assumed 
was a human nature, a specific human being. What happened when he 
became incarnate is that he adopted a peculiarly close and intimate relation 
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to a certain concrete human being, a 'human nature' in the sense of a 
human being. That is, there is or was a concrete human being-a creature, 
and a creature with will and intellect-to whom the Logos became related 
in an especially intimate way, a way denoted by the term 'assumption'. 
On this view of the matter, in the incarnate Christ there were two wills, one 
human and one divine, and two intellects, one human and one divine. 
This view is thought to protect the divinity of the second person of the 
Trinity. "No one knows about that day or hour, not even the angels in 
heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father" (Mark 13:32)-i.e. (on this view), 
the human nature (the human being) the Son has assumed does not know 
the day and the hour, although the Son Himself, presumably, does know. 
"For we do not have a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our 
weaknesses, but we have one who has been tempted in every way, just as 
we are-yet was without sin" (Hebrews 4:15)-Le., the human nature 
(human being) the Logos assumed was tempted in every way, just as we 
are, although the Son himself, presumably, was not. 
What shall we call these two views of the Incarnation? We could call 
them' Alexandrian' and' Antiochene' respectively, thus honoring the fact 
that the first is that of Cyril of Alexandria and his friends, and the second 
associated with Eustathius of Antioch and his friends. Or, we could name 
them after the heretical positions they ascribed to each other: the 
Antiochenes claimed the Alexandrians were Apollinarians, and the 
Alexandrians returned the compliment by calling the Antiochenes 
Nestorians. All of this is a bit too much for a poor ahistorical analytic 
philosopher, however, and I shall therefore name these positions by refer-
ence to the essential difference between them. In this context, the terms 
'nature' and 'human nature' get used in two analogically related but very 
different senses: in the first sense, the term 'human nature' denotes a property 
(or, if you like, group of properties): the property P which is such that neces-
sarily, every human being has P, and necessarily, whatever has P is a human 
being. In the second sense the term 'human nature' denotes a concrete human 
being rather than a property. In this second sense, the thing denoted by 
'human nature' and that gets assumed is a human being, a concrete object, 
not an abstract object like a property.1 I'll therefore call the first view the 
'abstract nature' view, and the second the 'concrete nature' view. Aquinas 
apparently endorses the concrete nature view; Augustine appears to accept 
the abstract nature view, although he also sometimes speaks as if it is the 
concrete view he holds. John Calvin follows Augustine in being a little 
ambiguous here, usually suggesting the abstract view, but sometimes falling 
(or ascending, depending on your preferences here) into the concrete view. 
Now at Chalcedon, the project was to hammer out a consensus, produce 
a document everyone could sign and live with. Of course there were rep-
resentatives of both views present, each contending for its understanding 
of the matter. What we actually get, so it seems to me, is a sort of compro-
mise: some terms and sentences pleasing to the ears of the concretists, and 
others pleasing to the ears of the abstractists. Apparently most scholars 
think the abstractists were perhaps at least slightly favored/ but the 
Chalcedonian formulation seems to point in both directions. It is therefore 
far from easy to find a completely coherent account of the incarnation in 
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Chalcedon (i.e., a coherent account different from each of the abstract and 
concrete nature views). It is as if the Chalcedonians, speaking with one 
voice, had said something like, "We somewhat prefer the abstract view, 
but we do not propose to read out of the party those who hold the concrete 
view, so long as they avoid the heresy of holding that the Incarnation con-
sists in the union, somehow, of two separate persons, so that in the 
Incarnate Lord, there is both a human person and a distinct divine person". 
But then what, exactly, constitutes heresy here? Suppose Chalcedon, as 
it seems it did, leaned slightly in the direction of the abstract view: would 
that mean that those, like Aquinas, who adopt the concrete view are really 
heretical? That seems a bit strong. At the third council of Constantinople, a 
couple of hundred years later (a council to which Catholics but not 
Protestants express allegiance), monothelitism (the idea that there was just 
one will in the incarnate Christ) was condemned. Now it looks as if the con-
cretist view is being adopted or at least given a leg up, and the abstractist 
rejected. That makes the task of being orthodox here even more dalmting. 
And to make things even more complicated, even here the original contro-
versy can be reflected: shall we say that duothelitism is the idea that the will 
of Christ had both the nature of a human will and the nature of a divine 
will, in the abstract sense of 'nature'? The partisans of the abstract view 
would happily accept that. Or shall we say that duothelitism is the idea 
that there are two distinct concrete wills (supposing that in fact a will is a 
concrete object of some kind)? The concretists would happily accept that, 
and then it looks as if it's the abstractists that are tugging the laboring oar. 
The point here is that it can become extremely difficult to say just what 
orthodoxy is, and therefore extremely difficult to say just what heresy is. 
Do we tum once more to the experts, asking some experts2 to try to figure 
out what exactly it is that the experts1 have decided? This is a pretty diffi-
cult and complex matter, and those experts2 are not likely to speak with a 
single voice; are we going to need experts3 to tell us what the experts2 
have decided about what the experts1 said? You can see where this is 
going. For this reason I think it is important to be extremely chary of 
charges of heresy. More exactly, the point is that charges of heresy have to 
take careful account of the clarity, obviousness, or lack thereof, of the 
proposition that the target view is indeed contrary to orthodoxy. 
I tum now to Peter van Inwagen's elegant contribution. His main sug-
gestion, with respect to my original advice, is perhaps this: "It seems to me, 
therefore, that the positive aspect of Plantinga's advice to Christian 
philosophers, if it contains nothing that is strictly false, has, as philosophers 
say, a false conversational implicature: That much of philosophy overlaps 
Christianity in a significant way" (p. 171). (Well, at any rate it's nice not to 
have said anything strictly false.) Peter goes on to add, in the spirit of 
uncontentious docility for which he is so widely and justly known, that 
"My suggestion that Plantinga's advice embodies a misleading implication 
about the relation between Christianity and philosophy should, therefore, 
be regarded not as a thesis I claim to have established, but as a provoca-
tion, an attempt to stimulate discussion". I have not been provoked by van 
Inwagen's suggestion, but I have been stimulated to further discussion; per-
haps I can clarify my advice a bit. 
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Now van Inwagen's suggestion is restricted to metaphysics and philoso-
phy of mind; things may go differently, he says, in epistemology (and, we 
may add, ethics). So I shall restrict what I have to say in the same way, and 
indeed to only one of the cases he mentions. The first case he raises (and 
the only case I shall discuss) is that of dualism vs. materialism with respect 
to human beings. Now I should confess up front that I accept dualism: I 
believe that I and other (living) human beings are immaterial souls, minds 
or persons (I prefer the last), related in a peculiarly intimate way to a mate-
rial body of a certain sort-a human body. The materialist, on the other 
hand (and of course, it is materialism with respect to human beings, not 
universal materialism, that is at issue) thinks that a human being is a mate-
rial object of a certain sort-a highly complex and very impressive material 
object, to be sure, but a material object nonetheless. It seems to me that 
dualism comports better with Christian thought than materialism 
(although I think there is powerful philosophical support for dualism inde-
pendent of Christian theism). Of course it is true, as van Inwagen says, 
that the creeds do not explicitly endorse dualism (although, as 1 shall argue 
below, it is likely that what some of them do endorse entails dualism). I do 
think, however, that various scripture passages do certainly suggest dual-
ism, and that the apostle Paul seems to accept it. 
But here 1 want to go in a slightly different direction. Consider again the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, that characteristic and nonnegotiable Christian 
teaching according to which the second person of the Trinity became incar-
nate and dwelt among us. As I understand the scripture and the creeds 
(Nicene, Athanasian, the Chalcedonian formulation), this involves the sec-
ond person of the Trinity's actually becoming human. The Logos became a 
human being, acquiring the property necessary and sufficient for being 
human. Prior to the incarnation, however, the second person of the Trinity 
was not a material object, but an immaterial being. If, however, as material-
ists assert, to be a human being is to be a material object, then the second per-
son of the Trinity must have become a material object. If he has remained a 
human being, furthermore, he is presently a material object. But then an 
immaterial being became a material object; and this seems to me to be 
impossible. It is clearly impossible, I'd say, that the number seven or the 
proposition that 7+5 = 12, or the property of self-exemplification, all of which 
are immaterial objects, should become, tum into, material objects. It is less 
clearly impossible, but still impossible, it seems to me, that the second person 
of the Trinity-that personal being with will and intellect and affection-
should tum into a material object. 
For me, therefore, and for Christians who agree with me on these points, 
the doctrine of the incarnation is deeply relevant to the question of materi-
alism vs. dualism. "Christians who agree with me"-i.e., Christians who 
agree with me on two points: 
(1) What the scripture and the creeds teach is that the Logos, the 
second person of the Trinity, became a human being 
and 
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(2) It is impossible that an immaterial being become a material 
object. 
(Perhaps I should also add 
(3) The Logos, before the incarnation, was an immaterial object; 
but I take it that isn't currently at issue.) 
Of course there are Christians who do not accept (1), opting instead for 
the concretist understanding of the Incarnation, or perhaps remaining 
agnostic as between the two. They will not take the doctrine of the 
Incarnation to be relevant, or at least relevant in the same way, to the ques-
tion of dualism vs. materialism. Perhaps there are also Christians who 
reject (2); if so, then they too will not take the Incarnation to be relevant in 
this way to dualism vs. materialism. But (and perhaps this is a needed 
clarification) it was no part or presupposition of my advice to suppose that 
a given doctrine will be properly taken to be relevant to a given philosoph-
ical problem either by all Christians or by no Christians. Christians may 
disagree as to the deliverances of reason (for example, some may be 
unwilling to assert (2»; this can of course have an impact on what deliver-
ances of faith they take to be relevant to what philosophical questions, and 
even on what they properly take Christian doctrines to entail. (If P and 
some necessary proposition Q together entail a proposition R, then P by 
itself entails R) Christians may also disagree on the question whether a 
given proposed deliverance of the faith (e.g., (1» really is a deliverance of 
the faith. Of course some faith-philosophy pairs are such that all or nearly 
all Christians, upon sufficient reflection, will take the former to be relevant 
to the latter; van Inwagen mentions some. But the relevance of deliver-
ances of the faith to the problems of philosophy extends far beyond that. 
Now we might instead think that the right way to describe the situation 
is to speak of what the deliverances of faith really are (as opposed to what 
someone or other properly takes them to be); and the same for the deliver-
ances of reason. Then we will speak of what really is relevant to what, 
rather than of what is properly taken to be relevant to what. But here there 
will be another kind of discussion relevant to philosophical thought: this 
will be discussion of just what the deliverances of faith really are. (And of 
course the deliverances of the faith are relevant to this discussion.) In the 
present case, for example, the question whether it is the abstractist or the 
concretist interpretation that is correct will, coupled with (2) above, be obvi-
ously relevant to the question of materialism vs. dualism. As van Inwagen 
says, the deliverances of the faith must be interpreted. This process of inter-
pretation itself, then, will sometimes be relevant to a philosophical problem, 
and will itself be something to which the faith is relevant. 
There are other complications here; a full discussion would take us far 
afield. Thus, for example, it might be that someone might take it that there 
are powerful philosophical reasons (reasons I have so far been unable to 
fathomJ) for materialism. Such a Christian might then have a reason for 
preferring the concretist interpretation of the incarnation, because that inter-
pretation permits her to be a materialist without flouting (2). There is a 
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complicated, complex, many-faceted reciprocal relation between deliver-
ances of the faith and deliverances of reason with respect to philosophical 
questions. Furthermore, it isn't merely what you take these deliverances to 
be that is relevant; also relevant are the questions (a) how much intuitive 
support the alleged deliverance of reason really has, and (b) how clear it is, 
or how probable it is, that the alleged deliverance of faith really is a deliver-
ance of faith. Thus if you take it that there are powerful philosophical rea-
sons for a given position-materialism, e.g.-and accept (2), and are slightly 
but only slightly inclined to the abstractist interpretation, you may quite 
properly, I should think, accept the concretist interpretation, even though 
you are mildly inclined on hermeneutical grounds to think it mistaken. In 
this way the deliverances of reason can properly influence what one proper-
ly takes to be orthodoxy (assuming that one takes orthodoxy to be sufficient 
for truth), or what one takes to be what the Lord intends to teach us. 
Exactly how this works here, exactly how one properly adjudicates the 
claims of the faith and the claims of reason, is a venerable topic that in my 
opinion needs a lot of work. One crucial notion here will be the 'comports 
with' relation. The limiting case of this relation will be where a deliverance 
of the faith F logically implies a proposition P-implies it by way of argu-
ment forms that are enshrined in first-order logic (and thus are maximally 
evident). Tn other cases F doesn't logically imply P by itself, but F and Q 
together do, where Q is an obviously necessary truth (a truth of elementary 
arithmetic, perhaps). Then of course there will be cases where Q is less 
obviously necessary, but still obviously necessary (perhaps Q is the propo-
sition that there aren't any things that do not exist), cases where the propo-
sition that it is necessary has only mild intuitive support, and so on. In this 
way the comports with relation will be a matter of degree, the degree to 
which P comports with F depending on the intuitive obviousness of the 
claim that Q is necessary, where F&Q together entail P: 
There is much more to be said about van Inwagen's thoughtful contri-
bution; for example, there are also his comments on agent causation and 
the problem of freedom, determinism and responsibility. Here too, I think, 
Christian belief is importantly relevant, but do not have the space to argue 
it; I hope to be able to address these and other questions in a book on 
Christian philosophy. 
I turn finally to Merold Westphal's interesting contribution. There is 
much in what he says with which I enthusiastically concur-for example, 
what he says about Art Holmes, and also what he says about the Wheaton 
College Philosophy Conference. I also believe that Westphal's 'two hats 
thesis' is correct and important; indeed, I think the Christian philosopher, 
or at any rate the Christian philosophical community, must wear more 
than two hats. Furthermore, I endorse his suggestion that the Christian 
philosophical community should do a good deal more than it has by way 
of writing for a wider and less technically proficient audience, although 
this is much easier said than done.5 And I applaud Westphal's approval of 
philosophical ecumenism. 
But there is also one point of reasonably significant disagreement. This 
has to do with propositions. Here Merold unaccountably joins forces with 
W. V. Quine, not ordinarily one of his chief allies, in thinking of proposi-
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tions as creatures of darkness. Indeed, although Quine has used that term 
to refer to properties, propositions and other perfectly respectable entities, 
Westphal has a better reason for thus stigmatizing them. After all, from 
Quine's perspective, all that's wrong with these things is that their condi-
tions of identity are obscure, and they clutter what would otherwise be an 
austerely pleasing desert landscape. According to Merold, however, the 
problem with these allegedly disreputable entities is that believing in them 
is a manifestation of sinful human pride! 
Now what is the problem with propositions, or more exactly with think-
ing there are propositions? The first problem, according to Westphal, is 
this: we ordinarily think of propositions as not belonging to any natural lan-
guage; but "this is to presuppose the highly controversial philosophical 
claim that meaning is independent of language, that natural languages are 
externally related to the meanings they convey" (p. 177). Now 1 should 
think propositions themselves are not meanings. Rather, meaning is what 
determines that a given sentence (in a given context or set of circumstances) 
expresses a given proposition. The proposition London, England, is larger 
than London, Ontario is expressed by the sentence 'London, England, is larg-
er than London, Ontario'; that is by virtue of the meaning that sentence in 
fact enjoys (in English). In this case, nearly every use of the relevant sen-
tence (or at any rate nearly every use in which it expresses a proposition at 
all) expresses the same proposition. The meaning of this sentence, then, is 
like a constant function: it takes pairs consisting of a use of the sentence and 
ambient circumstances to a given proposition, and always to the same 
proposition. In this way it differs from a sentence like 'I am happy', which 
takes pairs consisting of uses of the sentence and circumstances to different 
propositions. (When I use the sentence, it expresses the proposition that I 
am happy; when you use it, the proposition that you are happy.) But my 
point is that it isn't the propositions that are meanings; it is rather those func-
tions. And of course these meanings are intimately dependent upon natural 
languages, in that a natural language is, among other things, a matter of 
assigning such functions to items of natural language such as sentences. 
But perhaps this doesn't really address Westphal's worry. Perhaps he 
could agree with all this, but then put his worry as follows: "On the propo-
sitional picture, what gets expressed, i.e., these propositions, are thought to 
be only externally related to the natural languages and linguistic entities 
that express them. And that's wrong." Well, perhaps on this scheme the 
relation between the proposition London, England, is larger than London, 
Ontario, and the sentence 'London, England, is larger than London, Ontario' 
is indeed external to each; each could have existed, let's suppose, without 
standing in that relation to the other. But what's the matter with that? 
Perhaps the following. What really bothers Westphal about the propo-
sition picture, 1 think, is that he believes it implies, or leads to, or suggests 
that the language we speak has no bearing on the range of meanings (i.e., 
propositions) we can express or entertain. 1 base this on his saying "This is 
a much stronger claim than the one that in natural languages signs 
(graphemes and phonemes) are arbitrarily related to the meanings they 
signify; for meanings could easily be a function of the language games in 
which they are embedded (as Wittgensteinians, Heideggerians, structural-
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ists, and post-structuralists agree) without disturbing the arbitrary relation 
of signs to meanings" (p. 177). Here I take it Westphal means to concur 
with the thesis about the arbitrary relation of sign to meaning, but also 
endorse the view that meanings are indeed "a function of the language 
games in which they are embedded ... ", i.e., that what meanings (i.e., 
which propositions) we can entertain, express, grasp depends upon our 
language and linguistic resources. 
So his real concern is that if we accept the proposition picture, we will 
be committed to supposing that our languages, language games, lifestyles, 
positions in history, and the like, have no bearing on the range of proposi-
tions we can entertain and express. But once we get a clear look at this lat-
ter thesis, it is apparent that it is false. Even if propositions are indepen-
dent of natural languages, it doesn't for a moment follow that the range of 
propositions we can entertain and express is also independent of our lin-
guistic resources and other historically contingent circumstances. There 
are plenty of propositions I can entertain and express that my grandchil-
dren cannot. It is also entirely possible that some propositions are lan-
guage specific, in the sense that there are languages A and B and proposi-
tions P such that those who speak or know only A cannot entertain or 
express P, while those who speak B can. 
Still further, it is entirely consonant with the propositional picture that 
there be many propositions, in fact all but a finite few of them, that we 
human beings cannot so much as grasp or entertain no matter what our 
linguistic resources; indeed, I believe this is no more than the sober truth." 
Still further yet, it is entirely consonant with the propositional picture that 
for many or all of the propositions we do grasp, our grasp is imperfect, 
halting, poor, nasty and brutish even if not short, infected with error and 
misconception. Even if propositions themselves are not denizens of the 
cave, our grasp of them is just what you might expect of cave dwellers. 
Westphal says, "if our meanings [i.e., propositions] are free from embed-
dedness in the traditions and practices that make up natural language 
games, why should we not think them free from all the contingencies and 
particularities that make up the cave?" But even if propositions themselves 
are free from such embeddedness, it doesn't follow that our grasp and 
apprehension of them are; and of course they are not. Indeed, it is consis-
tent with the propositional picture (although not with advocacy of it) that 
we believe only false propositions. 
So I don't see that "The language game of proposition talk presupposes, 
with Descartes, and Locke, and sense data theorists ... that we begin in the 
ether of Pure Meaning and that the only task is to distinguish true proposi-
tions from false ones" (p. 177). I don't propose to take up the cudgels on 
behalf of sense data theorists (or even Descartes and Locke), but a proposi-
tion theorist can certainly think that an extremely important function of 
philosophical thinking is just trying to get a better look at certain crucial 
propositions, not just distinguish true propositions from false. Perhaps 
certain 'analytic' philosophers have mistakenly thought this the only func-
tion of philosophy; but I should think it is at least one of its functions. 
I turn finally to Westphal's worries about realism. This is not, as he sees 
it, just the view that there is a way things are ('in themselves'); for even Kant 
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held that. What the realist also believes, says Westphal, is that we human 
beings "(sometimes) know the real as it truly is, as it is in itself, as it is inde-
pendently of human modes of apprehension" (p. 178). If I espouse realism, 
am I not improperly minimizing the difference between my intellect and 
God's, my knowledge and divine knowledge? The realist, he says, can 
acknowledge that God knows a lot more propositions than the rest of us, 
"But when we do know a proposition to be true, that piece of our knowledge 
is fully on a par with God's knowledge of the same proposition" (p. 178). 
Again, it seems to me the realist is not committed to anything nearly so 
strong. First, there is that matter of depth of grasp of a proposition; I might 
know a set theoretical truth, but not have nearly as firm a grasp on it, might 
not see nearly as deeply into it, as someone who is expert in the area. 
Second, as Westphal points out later, your knowledge of a given proposition 
can be qualified by what else you know; I know (let's suppose) that electrons 
have a negative charge; someone who knows how this proposition is con-
nected with a lot of others, I should say, knows the same thing better. And 
of course God's knowledge vastly, unimaginably, excels ours along both of 
these dimensions. Still further, it isn't even possible (in the broadly logical 
sense) that God err; our possibilities along those lines are all too evident. 
But perhaps there is an even greater difference between God's knowl-
edge and ours (a difference entirely consistent with the propositional pic-
ture). Propositions exist in serene independence of us and our activities; 
they don't depend in any way upon us, and if we didn't exist, that would 
be no skin off their nose(s). But most Christian thinkers have not thought 
that they are related in that way to God. Beginning at least with 
Augustine, most have thought propositions dependent upon God. Indeed 
perhaps the way to think of them is as divine thoughts; they depend upon 
God in just the way thoughts depend upon their thinker.7 God's thought is 
thus creative: in thinking, he creates propositions. Our thought is at best 
recapitulative: it consists in a grasp (and perhaps a halting and infirm 
grasp) of things, i.e., propositions, which exist in serene independence of 
us, and indeed have existed for an eternity before we so much as put in an 
appearance. This difference between our intellect and God's is enormous. 
So I can't see that Christian philosophers "have a special reason for 
rejecting" realism. Indeed, I think the shoe is on the other foot: Christian 
philosophers and Christians generally have a real stake in affirming realism, 
in Westphal's sense. For in that sense I am a realist if I think I believe or 
know at least one truth-one truth, perhaps we should add, that is about 
things as they are in themselves, independent of human ways of knowing. 
(Of course my knowledge of this truth will not be independent of human 
ways of knowing, those being the only ways of knowing I have.) Well, it 
seems to me Christians are committed to thinking they know or believe 
several such truths. The gospel, after all, is good news; and if good news, 
then news., i.e., something true. (There's no such thing as false news.) It is 
magnificent good news that God was in Christ, reconciling the world to 
Himself; hence it is also true that God was in Christ, reconciling the world 
to himself. And in knowing this, do I not know something about God, and 
God as he is in himself? If Westphal thinks this isn't true, or isn't a truth 
about God, how does he think of its status? Well, perhaps some continen-
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tal super sophisticate (and I don't mean Merold) might be able to come up 
with some way in which this isn't a truth about God (perhaps she could 
give us a new gloss on about), but why bother? What is the problem? 
But I don't want to end on a note of disagreement. There is much in 
what Westphal says, and much in what he says is his motivation for anti-
realism, to which I can only say "Yea and Amen". Thus of course it is 
important to see that" As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my 
ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughtsff (Isa. 
55:9); God is unimaginably different from us, and his thoughts unimagin-
ably above, higher than, beyond ours. When Paul was caught up into the 
third heaven, he "heard inexpressible things, things that man is not permit-
ted to tell"(2 Cor. 12:4). Furthermore, I agree that "making assertions of 
fact ... is just one of the many things we can do with words" (p. 178), and 
that it is important to "remember that when God speaks to us we are more 
likely to be dealing with promises, warnings, commands and the like than 
with mere assertions of fact" (p. 178). Still further, I too want to challenge 
the primacy of theoretical reason; and of course I wholeheartedly reject the 
idea that our chief end is to collect a pocket full of propositions about God. 
Of course not; our chief end is to glorify God-i.e., perceive and celebrate 
and delight in His marvelous beauty and glory-and enjoy Him forever. 
On all of these points we are in solid concord; our disagreement is only as 
to whether this agreement is incompatible with accepting the propositional 
picture.s 
University of Notre Dame 
NOTES 
1. If we like, we can use the term 'human nature' in both senses in the 
same sentence: Jesus Christ was a single nature, but had two distinct natures, 
one human and the other divine. 
2. Commenting on the "leading ideas" of the Chalcedonian formulation, 
Philip Schaff says, "The Logos assumed, not a human person (else we would 
have two persons, a divine and a human) but human nature which is common 
to us all; and hence he redeemed, not a particular man, but all men as partak-
ers of the same nature" The Creeds of Christendom (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1877), vol. I The History of Creeds, p. 30. J. N. D. Kelly makes a similar 
but somewhat more reserved judgment (The Early Christian Doctrines (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 340 ff.) 
3. Some might claim (indeed, some have claimed) that a reason for materi-
alism is the fact that human beings are visible, thus having a property which no 
immaterial object has. But of course if dualism is true, human beings are visi-
ble, although in an extended, analogical sense; they are visible because their 
bodies are. We are playing monopoly; you ask me what color my token is; I 
reply "I'm the red jeep". What I say is true, but you could hardly use it as rea-
son for denying that I am an immaterial entity citing the fact that I have the 
property being the red jeep, a property no immaterial object has. 
4. And where there is no other proposition Q* such that F&Q* entail P, 
and the necessity of Q* is intuitively more obvious than the necessity of Q. Still 
other conditions are necessary; this is not the place to propose them. 
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5. Still, it is being done, to at least some extent, by for example Richard 
Swinburne (Is there a God?), Kelly Clark (When Faith is Not Enough), and the 
authors of the essays in Michael Murray's Reason for the Hope Within. 
6. Thus most propositions of the form r is greater than 0 (r a real number) 
are beyond our grasp. Of course that doesn't preclude our knowing something 
about them; indeed, perhaps we can pick out specific propositions that are 
beyond our grasp, and predicate properties of them. 
7. This is consistent with their being necessarily existent; what it requires 
is that God be a necessary being and that it be part of God's nature to think 
them. 
8. My thanks to Brian Daley and Neal Plantinga. 
